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The article proposes an enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment and dissolution of 
governmental units, giving autonomy to each resident as in a direct democracy. Rather than focusing 
on a narrow model with restrictive and specialized assumptions, and subsequent solutions, as has 
been common in the literature, the article takes individuals seriously acknowledging that they are best 
equipped to find their own solutions. The emphasis is on the practical approach of how individuals 
discover and implement their subjective preferences and how this discovery and implementation 
process can be facilitated and corresponding costs lowered. Governmental units are subjected to 
some of the same market forces as ordinary firms, in the spirit of Coase (1988a). This brings the 
interaction between governmental units closer to a market structure, and serves to eliminate or 




















Increasing globalization and concomitant flows of people, goods, services, and capital across 
borders at the superstate, state, regional, and local levels make the regulation or non-regulation of 
creation, adjustment, and  dissolution  of states and local territorial governmental units especially 
relevant. The history of international political and constitutional economy has traditionally assumed 
borders as exogenously given, despite the fact that borders are continuously redrawn through a 
variety of mechanisms. 
 
At the turn of the millennium a literature gradually emerges
1 which accounts, in the tradition of recent 
trends within economic theory, for the endogenous determination of borders.
2 The literature can 
tentatively or stereotypically be divided into “American” and “European” approaches, which refers 
more to funders of research than to where researchers are geographically located. The American 
approach, starting with Tiebout (1956), recognizes the importance of competitive units at the local 
level, and focuses, in the spirit of Buchanan and Faith (1987), on a competitive structure’s ability to 
optimize local governmental services and taxes. Extensions are made by Alesina and Spolaore 
(1997,2003), Glomm and Lagunoff (1998), Casella (2001ab).
3 In contrast the European approach 
centers on trade between nations, and optimization of the number of nations in a trading context. 
Examples are Bolton and Roland (1997) and Bolton et al. (1996). 
 
A common result is that democratization leads to secessions which, together with international 
economic integration, imply inefficiently many countries (Alesina and Spolaore 1997), a result we 
criticize in section 5 since it violates Pareto optimality. Alesina and Spolaore (2003) correctly “argue 
that the optimal size of a country is determined by a cost-benefit trade-off between the benefits of 
size and the costs of heterogeneity.” 
4 A variety of other factors, unknown and unknowable to us, 
and in many cases even unknown to each individual, also play a role. Further, Casella (2001b:83) 
                                                                 
1 In earlier analyses, analyzing the size of nations, Wittman (1991) argues that wealth maximization is 
determinative. Friedman (1977) shows that nations are shaped to maximize joint revenue, net of collection costs, 
and that trade should imply large nations, rent should imply small nations, and labor should imply that nations 
will have closed boundaries or be culturally homogeneous. 
2 See Hausken (2000) for a treatment of how group size is determined endogenously by intergroup migration. 
3 See Dowding et al. (1994) for a survey of the empirical Tiebout literature, noting that Tiebout is quoted in 1000+ 
articles. See John et al. (1995) for a micro-level test of the behavioral assumptions of the Tiebout model.  
4 More specifically, “in a large country, per capita costs may be low, but the heterogeneous preferences of a large 
population make it hard to deliver services and formulate policy. Smaller countries may find it easier to respond to 
citizen preferences in a democratic way.”  
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argues that “the optimal number of jurisdictions is unique and increases with market size,” and 
Bolton and Roland  (1997:1057) argue that “separation occurs in equilibrium” “when income 
distributions vary across regions and the efficiency gains from unification are small,” but that “all 
incentives for separation disappear” “when all factors of production are perfectly  mobile.” One 
deficiency of Bolton and Roland’s (1997:1057) result is the assumption that welfare is maximized 
when the median voter’s tax preferences are satisfied (majority voting). In the absence of unanimity 
there is no guarantee that this is the case, as shown by Wicksell (1896) and Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962).
5 Results of these and similar kinds will continue to emerge from this literature, generating a 
web of models. To allow for analytical tractability and sufficiently specific results, restrictive or 
specialized assumptions typically have to be made, often combined with a narrow focus. As Levins 
(1966,1985) suggests with respect to model building, “truth is the intersection of multiple lies.” Care 
should be exercised when drawing conclusions from the specialized models that emerge. 
 
An unfortunate side effect of the analytical approach is that the focus on a mathematical solution 
implementable by social economists takes attention away from the practical approach of how to 
discover and implement the subjective preferences of the people. For a majority of people 
subjective preferences and beliefs are often n ot known or not explicitly verbalized. Even when 
known and verbalized, subjective preferences and beliefs are often not available quantitatively for 
mathematical treatment. If we could construct a complete preference schedule for all individuals, 
incorporating future innovations in technology and organization would be difficult. (If we knew about 
them, they wouldn’t be innovations.) Rigorous analytical models frequently lack the flexibility needed 
to accommodate innovations. This may lead to less adaptation and less expression of new 
innovations, and lower growth over time. While in the study of a particular market, mathematical 
models are useful tools in as far as they may allow predicting market action given a specified set of 
assumptions, they may become impediments to change from the moment the assumptions are taken 
to be universally valid, and the models are used to prescribe the actions of individual agents.  
 
                                                                 
5 Unanimity takes on a special role in Wicksell’s (1896) treatment, highly influential on Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962). Buchanan translated Wicksell to English, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) devoting considerable portions of 
their book to unanimity, Pareto optimality and decision making rules. Note that what Bolton and Roland 
(1997:1079) in a normative statement call the ”damaging effects of fiscal competition” and “inefficiencies of fiscal 
competition” does tend to increase the effective majority behind a particular level of taxation, which may assure a 
more Pareto optimal structure. I.e., while 50% of the population favors a tax rate of 30%, 90% of the population  
 
5
Neither the American nor European approaches have focused much on what is empirically the most 
important reasons for state creation; social, cultural, religious and ethnic issues. Lacking is also the 
welfare benefits like less war, revolution, etc. associated with lower barriers to entry. The focus on 
narrowly defined economic utility inadequately accounts for utility which is difficult to measure. Frey 
et al. (2001) attempt to remedy this by  “process utility”  and  “outcome utility”, demonstrating 
empirically that “reported subjective well-being of the population is much higher in jurisdictions with 
stronger direct democratic rights,” deriving utility derived from the political process itself.
6 
 
This article proposes an enabling mechanism designed to reduce the costs associated with 1) the 
creation (establishment, birth) of governmental units, 2) the adjustment of unit borders, and 3) the 
dissolution (termination, death) of units. Optimal solutions can only be achieved through the inclusion 
of individuals in the decision making process. Given the proper decision making procedures and 
institutional framework, conflict is not necessary, as has been claimed, between democracy and the 
optimum size of a governmental unit. The approach is firmly embedded in the economic tradition, but 
has a broad rather than narrow focus, and avoids restrictive and specialized assumptions. The focus 
is on the operative side of the mechanisms, and not on the solutions which abound in the literature, 
often based on a narrow focus with restrictive and specialized assumptions. The autonomy is 
allocated down to the individual level, which this article argues is the best level to ensure preferred 
solutions. At the individual level we distinguish between domiciliary
7, individual  citizen
8, and 
resident
9. This article mostly uses the term domiciliary which denotes a higher degree of territorial 
permanence than citizen or resident. The appropriate term depends on the type of governmental unit 
(super-national, state, regional or local government, etc.).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
may favor a rate of 10%. Thus lower taxes may bring us closer to unanimity, and hence a more optimal solution.  
6 Frey (1996) and Casella and Frey (1992) also propose FOCJ (functional overlapping and competing 
jurisdictions). These FOCJ are essentially the same as the regional bodies proposed by Knutsen (1992). Unlike 
Knutsen (1992) and Hausken and Knutsen (2002), Frey (1996) does not propose a specific creation mechanism 
which is one purpose of this article. As shown by Knutsen (1992) there is no conflict between these regional 
bodies and the mechanisms for creation of governmental units proposed in this article. That being said, while 
Frey (1996) elaborates on Knutsen (1992) in the context of why competing units ought to be established, Frey’s 
article does not, in sufficient detail, establish how this should be accomplished. 
7 Domiciliary: A person who resides in a particular place with the intention of making it a principal place of abode; 
one who is domiciled in a particular jurisdiction. (Garner 1999) 
8 Citizen: A person who, by either birth or naturalization, is a member of a political community… Being entitled to 
enjoy all its civil rights and protections (Garner 1999). The term citizen usually has meaning only at the state level, 
with extensions e,g, to European Union citizen. 
9 Resident: A person who has a residence in a particular place. A resident is not necessarily either a citizen or a 




Enabling mechanisms are also present in market based economics e.g. in the corporate world. The 
world’s financial markets owe their existence to the invention of the joint stock company with its fully 
transferable share of stock. The legal form of ownership may from a theoretical point of view, seem 
to have limited impact. Partnerships or sole proprietorships  would seem to be  as efficient as 
corporations and traditional economics has not focused on the legal form. However, the ease of 
transfer of ownership and thus the attractiveness of the share of stock has proved to be of major 
importance in the real world and has powered both the creation of financial markets and the growth 
of industrial and post-industrial enterprises and the accumulation of real wealth on an immense scale. 
Thus by creating markets where virtually none existed e nabling mechanisms have an immense 
impact. 
 
The article lets individuals perform a benefit versus cost evaluation  and transit through and exit 
governmental u nits. Exit is free, but may be reduced by ownership of resources connected with 
territory, travel costs, cultural barriers, etc. Entry, however, may or may not be free depending on 
the preferences of the population. It is possible for a governmental unit to maintain higher standards 
in certain respects, e.g. a higher level of investment in infrastructure and charge new domiciliaries a 
fee corresponding to a portion of this sunk investment. Such a fee likely prevents or ameliorates free 
riding. Without a fee, entry likely increases, and investment in infrastructure, social services (e.g. 
pension rights) and other non-exclusive public goods likely spirals downward and gets reduced 
below the level desired by the original population. A fee is not common for transits across today's 
nation states, though there is a flourishing black market fee system where criminals charge would-be 
emigrants from the third world for possible and risky entry into the first world. Instead of a fee, 
today's richer countries (e.g. Europe, North America ) commonly shut their gates, with few 
loopholes. This article lets individuals within each governmental unit design a preferred function that 
determines entry criteria.  
 
Buchanan (1987:1029,1031) suggests that immigration policy will be contentious when incomes 
differ in the original polity, and that the poor tend to lose out because they remain outside the sharing 
coalition of each polity. I.e., “those who are poor remain outside the sharing coalition and, because 
they remain poor, they  cannot readily secede. They either remain subject to maximal fiscal  
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exploitation or possibly resort to extreme measures such as revolution.” Our approach lowers the 
cost of secession, reducing exploitation by the rich and powerful. Immediate beneficiaries are the 
poor and/or those currently subject to economic or other exploitation like minority discrimination 
etc.,  who can more easily secede. In the longer run the approach benefits everybody as 
governmental units become more cost effective and responsive. Similarly for firms, some cater to the 
rich, some to the poor, and some to both, dependent on focus on quality, price, or niche (Porter 
1985). As for traditional market based goods and services, there is no reason to believe that the 
poor will be left out, though the range of goods, services, opportunities, etc available to them may be 
different. Overall, we believe that the increased welfare benefits everyone Pareto optimally. 
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that our approach leads to a completely homogenous set 
of governmental units even though individual units (notably small scale units e.g. local government) 
may become more internally homogonous. Complementarities and division of labor, etc. will always 
exist. A rich country such as Switzerland, equipped with a fragmented and decentralized decision 
making model also in terms of immigration decisions, have among the largest foreign populations in 
Europe suggesting that a more decentralized decisionmaking structure may in fact as expected, 
increase diversity across units. 
 
Externalities come in many shapes and forms, external to each individual, with respect to each 
governmental unit, and with respect to governmental functions. Since we do not use an idealized 
model, but deal with messy reality, decisions by individuals and governmental units will affect other 
individuals and governmental units. This is not a shortcoming of our enabling mechanism, since any 
mechanism dealing with the real world, as opposed to an idealized theoretical model, will face the 
same issues. A first-best solution may not be available, but among the second-best solutions in 
today’s literature, the approach in this article represents a viable alternative. Our model is inferior to 
one imposed by an omnipotent omniscient social scientist, but as we shall never have an omnipotent 
omniscient social scientist this argument is irrelevant. The question is whether the proposed 
mechanism is better than the current one, which has a variety of disadvantages described in this 
article, such as reliance on war, violence, coercion. This article suggests that the answer is yes since 
it allows more choice than  today’s model. As in real markets we expect  that  widespread 
implementation of our model will enable innovations ameliorating dysfunctional externalities. Within 
the constraints imposed by the real world, governmental units will likely tend towards their optimal  
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size as determined by individual preferences. An optimal stationary solution will never be reached, 
since innovations in technology and organization, changes in culture, demography, population and 
preferences, and  changing birth and death  rates of individuals constantly alter what is optimal. 
Desicionmaking by autonomous individuals, however, jointly assure movement toward an ever 
changing optimal solution. 
 
The common mechanisms for the creation and growth of states and distribution of wealth through 
human history  have been  warfare, violence, appropriation, defense, exploitation, theft, raiding, 
robbery, etc. Also today, “war can pay”, just as robbery and theft can pay in a market economy 
otherwise based on voluntary exchange. Non-voluntary or non-free exchanges have traditionally 
been more important than they are today, and have in large parts of today’s world been marginalized 
measured relatively to the total sizes of economies. The last centuries have witnessed a certain shift 
in emphasis from military warfare to economic warfare. A variety of factors play a role, such as 
technological progress, the emergence of rule of law, police, etc., but also self-coordination by self-
interested individuals. Rather than population groups conquering territory and raiding other groups, 
global firms compete for market share. Rather than soldiers fighting physically, today lawyers and 
other professionals “ fight”  through political campaigning, rent-seeking maneuvers for licenses and 
monopoly privileges (Tullock 1967), commercial efforts to raise rivals’ costs (Salop and Scheffman 
1983), strikes and lockouts, litigation, etc. 
 
Fortunately, literature e merges  describing processes  of fighting applying economic concepts, 
honoring individual decisionmaking. Examples are Grossman and Kim (1995), Hirshleifer (2001), 
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001).
10 This ensures compatibility with the approach in this article 
applying Coases’ (1988a) theory of firms on governmental units,  observing that  firms and 
governmental units are subjected to some of the same market forces. Enabling  mechanisms for 
markets and enforcement mechanisms for voluntary exchange can thus emerge for governmental 
units, just as for firms. Autonomous individuals engage in decisionmaking and voluntary exchange, 
and may through various mechanisms, as history has shown, endogenously choose to refrain from 
warfare. E.g., Hausken (2004a) shows how voluntary exchange can emerge in a world of mutual 
                                                                 
10 Whereas political science has traditionally accounted for distribution mechanisms where power, non-voluntary 
exchange, etc. play a role, classical economics has traditionally confined attention to production, consumption,  
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raiding, appropriation, and defense, when the appropriated production is less valuable to the 
appropriator than to the defender and the defense is not too inferior to attack. 
 
As a dysfunctional externality, assume that 100 individuals have read Hausken’s (2000) description 
of the benefits of migrating from groups with high productive efficiency to groups with high fighting 
efficiency. If these 100 individuals decide to create their own governmental unit and focus on raiding 
the wealth of all surrounding units, the natural response of the surrounding units is to search for 
defense and survival mechanisms beyond those considered by Hausken (2000).
11 To the extent the 
defense is superior to attack, as Clausewitz (1832:6.1.2) points out is often the case, the violent 
governmental unit will lose members. It may alternatively be cut off from various kinds of between-
unit affairs, such as trade, humanitarian aid, etc. as often happens for nation states that do not follow 
UN resolutions. A violent governmental unit may not get dissolved, but it may lose significance. 
Emigration may occur, and remaining inhabitants may endogenously find an interest in redesigning its 
function from within to regain the trust and be welcome within the community of governmental units. 
Developments like these, marginalizing violent groups, have been common over the last centuries. 
 
Alternatively, assume that 100 individuals either within a new or existing unit engage in wasteful 
political processes, e.g. as described by Congleton (1980). Individuals may engage in dysfunctional 
bargaining, individual rent seeking, bribery, political wheeling and dealing, etc. Individuals losing out 
in this battle may either choose the “exit” option, leaving those left behind worse off since they have 
fewer to exploit. Alternatively, individuals losing out may redesign their governmental function, thus 
shaping themselves up.
12 History suggests that marginalizing violent groups has been more successful 
than marginalizing groups engaged in political wasteful processes, which is common today. 
 
Well designed enabling mechanisms for the creation, adjustment and dissolution of governmental 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
exchange, ignoring, as Hirshleifer (2001) puts it, “the dark side of the force”. 
11 Similarly, having earlier focused on the IRA and spies from the cold war era, a democracy such as the UK 
currently expands its MI5 to meet the Al Queda threat. 
12 Note in this regard Hirschman’s (1970) “distinction between alternative ways of reacting to deterioration in 
business firms and, in general, to dissatisfaction with organizations: one-exit-is for the member to quit the 
organization or for the customer to switch to the competing product, and the other-voice-is for members or 
customers to agitate and exert influence for change ‘from within’.... Hirschman’s (1970) questions “the efficiency 
of the competitive mechanism, with its total reliance on exit…. As exit often undercuts voice while being unable 




units may, if successful, replace the current mechanisms and result in major advances in human 
welfare. A view gradually emerges that competition between governmental units is desirable, just as 
competition between firms is desirable. Early research in this direction has been made by Knag and 
Knutsen (1990), Knutsen (1992), Casella and Frey (1992), Frey and Eichenberger (1996), and 
Frey (2001). The main differences between the three latter articles and the current article are, first, a 
more carefully worked out and consistent definition of a governmental unit. Second, for a 
governmental unit we introduce an enabling mechanism which consists of a creation mechanism, 
adjustment mechanism, and dissolution mechanism. Our enabling mechanism provides a specific and 
straightforward account of the relevant processes. Since the purpose of this paper is to present an 
enabling mechanism for competitive governmental units, we do not seek to “prove” our assertions in 
a narrow sense. In our opinion, a well designed and articulated enabling mechanism is the key to 
success, just as the joint stock company (corporation) provided the nucleus for the financial 
markets. Most markets require some form of enabling mechanism to function. The world’s financial 
markets were only able to develop with the invention of shares of stock. Thus the invention of the 
limited liability share based company provides the foundation for all of the world’s stock markets. 
The “governmental unit” market, however, is as undeveloped or underdeveloped today as the equity 
markets where prior to the limited company invention. Even though “applied” constitutional 
economics may not carry the same prestige as more theoretical work, though this remains to be 
seen, the benefits to society may be greater. Knutsen (1992) provides a more comprehensive set of 
mechanisms and discussions beyond the scope of a single article.  
 
Section 2 provides the disadvantages of the present (i.e. today’s) constitutional model. Section 3 
defines a governmental unit. Section 4 provides an alternative constitutional model, with advantages 
and limitations in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Disadvantages of the present constitutional model 
We distinguish between the temporary direct disadvantages of the present mechanisms associated 
with the methods for the creation, adjustment, and dissolution of units, and various permanent or 
semi-permanent indirect disadvantages caused by the lack of competition between units.  
1.  Present mechanisms rely to a large extent on coercion and violence, with substantial human 







2.  Many units do not have the kind of governmental, legal or social institutions that the 
population wants. Citizens often feel alienated from governmental affairs, and a lack of ability 
to influence. 
3.  Many units do not efficiently provide the population with the services it wants, i.e. resources 
are squandered and growth hampered by a dysfunctional (e.g. large and inefficient) public 
sector.
16 
4.  Many units have a consistent majority/minority issue due to ethnic, religious or other factors.  
5.  The artificially determined sizes and boundaries of units cause unit dysfunctionality. 
6.  Artificially determined exit and entry barriers, often combined with the “tyranny” of the 
majority over the minority, causes at least some residents to be located in a unit against their 
will. 
7.  Present mechanisms often cause the emergence and/or continuance of units which are either 
dysfunctionally large or small with respect to geographical dispersion or the numbers of 
residents within their borders.
17 
8.  Unit size is not presently dynamic so innovations in organization or technology are not 
                                                                 
13 The total number of people dying from war in the 20
th century equaled 10% of the world population in 1913. 
While it is clear that war and violent revolution reduce the general welfare immeasurably in the short term, the 
fact that these hardships are tolerated points to important perceived welfare benefits in the long term. To put it 
simply, if there hadn’t been important perceived long-term benefits, there wouldn’t have been so many wars, 
uprisings and revolutions. 
14 See Congleton (1980) for an interesting model explaining why anarchy or “state of nature” (which is the present 
state in most cases for the creation, adjustment, and dissolution of borders) leads to waste of resources on non-
productive processes such as bargaining, monopolizing, conquest, bribery, etc. 
15 For example, a new unit may be created by local government reorganization initiated by a central authority, or in 
a state context, through “liberation”, war, revolution, violent partition or UN Resolution. A unit may go extinct by 
losing a war (extinguished from without) or by revolution (extinguished from within). In a nation state or country 
context most creations and dissolutions of territorial units dysfunctionally take place in a context of violence and 
coercion. The creation of new states within the US was to some extent peaceful, aside from some Indian 
opposition. Opposition from original habitants is common, though there are examples especially in early human 
history of peaceful colonization of newly discovered uninhabited territories. 
16 The public sector within the OECD member countries controls about 37% of GDP ranging from about 31% in 
the U.S. to about 60% in Sweden (tax revenues as % of GDP, 1998 figures from OECD website except US and 
Sweden figures which are preliminary 2003 figures) in OECD countries and has significantly lower productivity 
growth (in some cases negative) than the rest of the economy.  
17 In the US with its relatively homogenous culture there is a very significant size difference between Rhode 
Island and California. Even though we do not know the “optimal” state size, the current span in units with similar 
functions and organization suggests that there may be room for optimization. Similarly Casella and Frey 
(1992:644) argue non-mathematically when discussing legal subdivisions of government within the US, that “no 
mention is made of the obvious fact that traditional legal subdivisions have become obsolete.” This 
obsoleteness is largely due to the assumption of fixed borders. Casella and Frey (1992) do not provide a solution 
to the dysfunctionality of fixed borders, which of course is the purpose of this article.   
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reflected in changes to unit size and organization.
18 
9.  The prevalence of rent seeking often incurs costs equaling or superceding the value of the 
rent (Krueger 1974, Posner 1975, Tullock 1980). There is widespread rent seeking among 
groups within units and also cross-border rent seeking, e.g. where units try to tax activities 
beyond their own borders.
19 
10. The lack of resource mobility between units is dysfunctional related to rent seeking
20 and for 
other reasons. Even though financial assets may move quite freely between units, the most 
important real factors are severely restricted in their mobility. The two most important 
examples are 1) land, including the natural and man-made resources associated with the land 
(oil and gas resources, ores, minerals, timber, agricultural products, factories, buildings, 
mines, residential housing etc.) and 2) people. Land in general “moves” only by war, and 
people mobility is restricted by natural, cultural, social, and institutional barriers.
21 
11. Although collective action has advantages, e.g. lower cost than the market price for certain 
activities, there are also disadvantages, as the literature has demonstrated. Even with 
democracy, there are still issues related to collective decision making that are unavoidable. 
Although representative democracy with majority decision making of some sort in many 
respects is superior to e.g. dictatorial decision making, there are imperfections related to the 
recording of each individual’s preference function and methodological issues related to the 
weighing of each individual’s function with respect to all other individuals in the collective 
                                                                 
18 It may ease the understanding of this issue to consider that many state borders in the Eastern part of the 
United States have remained essentially unchanged for more than 200 years. Even assuming that borders were 
optimal at the time they came into existence, it is reasonable that not all of them are optimal today taking into 
account the considerable changes in technology the last 200 years. 
19 Many countries, the U.S. included, tax their citizens on worldwide income independent of their residence and 
the source of the income. 
20 Caplan (2001) has shown that when borders are set exogenously, it is possible even for local governmental 
units to extract significant rent from citizens through property taxation. Caplan’s (2001:101) conclusion is that 
“the only check on local governments comes through imperfectly functioning electoral channels.” If borders are 
not exogenous, as is the case in this article, the rent extraction indicated by Caplan is no longer possible since 
citizens can exit together with their real property (housing). 
21 Examples limiting people mobility, especially across higher order governmental units, are immigration law, 
language barriers and lack of cross-border skill recognition. If e.g. a Frenchman is dissatisfied with his 
government’s policies and wants to move, he has to deal with more commuting or abandonment of contact with 
friends and family, most likely a new language (e.g. Spanish, English or German), a new social code requiring 
possibly years of effort to gain new social skills appropriate to his new abode, having to find a new place to live 
and work involving large transaction costs, and much time and effort with the task of just finding his way about 
his new place of residence. As the US has few formal internal barriers to the movement of people, and as 
academics are given highly preferential treatment in most countries’ immigration law, share a common language 
(English) and to a large extent a common culture, the substantial real and mental barriers to general people 
mobility may not be fully appreciated. It is easy to confuse one’s own position within a small economic and  
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preventing the achievement of a clearcut optimal solution.
22 
 
3 A Governmental Unit 
Our alternative constitutional model in section 4 provides an enabling mechanism for a governmental 
unit which we define with three necessary and sufficient characteristics 
 
1. A territorial unit or area with a specified geographical extent at the local, regional, or global level.  
2. At least one governmental function which specifies a set of rules which can only be set aside 
through collective decision making.  
3. A population of domiciliaries (at least one) which lays a foundation for collective decision making. 
 
A governmental unit presumes a territory, which is essential for the phenomena analyzed in this 
article. The territory need not be contiguous or large, but its extent must be non-zero.
23 The crucial 
aspect of territory is that it cannot be physically moved.
24 In contrast, individuals perform a benefit 
versus cost evaluation when moving across territories and between governmental units, bringing with 
them portable assets. Owners of resources connected with territory
25 can also theoretically bring 
these with them, for better utilization elsewhere, or to bring “out of harm’s way”. But, in reality, this 
is often excessively costly, making these owners  uniquely  vulnerable. Ownership of resources 
connected with territory, costs of changing permanent residence, travel costs, language barriers, 
cultural barriers, possession of specific competencies, etc. reduce movement across governmental 
units. These factors influence entry and exit of governmental units, which is otherwise free or as 
specified in the governmental function. I.e., to establish a benchmark, we purify our argument 
excluding from consideration entry versus exist systems based on force or threat of force.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
intellectual elite (perhaps 0,5% on a worldwide basis) with that of the general public. 
22 One example is that the majority gets its way and the minority loses out. Another example is e.g. the problem of 
cyclic majorities described by Black (Black 1958) and Condorcet (see Black 1958). Consider a three-person village 
using majority voting as a means of ranking each pair of alternatives. A clear-cut social ordering need not 
emerge. If Ann’s preferences are I,II,III, Ben’s are II,III,I, and Bill’s are III,I,II, then, in pairwise votes, I beats II, II 
beats III, and III beats I. 
23 Territory has a fixed three-dimensional extent consisting of a surface area, proceeding inwards toward the 
center of the earth, and proceeding outwards into the atmosphere and beyond. Governmental units, which may 
overlap each other, cover the entire universe. Since each individual has a physical extent, it is impossible for an 
individual to avoid governmental units altogether. 
24 In principle, a slice of the earth can be cut off and moved to another location, leaving empty space. This empty 
space cannot be moved, and is thus different from portable assets.  
25 Examples are permanent structures on, below, or above a surface area, masses of earth, stone, mineral ores, 




A governmental unit differs from a geographical unit through assuming at least one governmental 
function which specifies a set of rules. This function is neither market based nor based on voluntary 
exchange. This introduces an inevitable coercive element agreed upon by domiciliaries through 
collective decision making. The governmental function can be set aside neither by individual nor 




A governmental unit presuming a territory makes it different from a club or a firm, which may have 
functions and some form of management or government, but need not have a territory. (Re firms, see 
Coase 1988c.) Our definition does not specify any particular form of the governmental function(s). 
We seek to establish a benchmark, allocate maximum autonomy to each individual, and avoid 
constraining collective decision making by factors above the individual level. Contrary to many 
theorists and practitioners within economics and political science, this article suggests that one 
cannot be certain as to what governmental units ought to concern themselves with. Hence our 
approach is similar to Coase’s (1988b) approach. I.e., we apply Coase’s (1988a) theory for firms, 
and develops it for governmental units. Individual market participants o ptimize themselves 
governmental functions just as individual firms optimize the boundary between internal and external 
market transactions. This gives a flexible state of affairs where decision making is driven from below. 
Alienation from governmental affairs is eliminated. Each individual agent is given autonomy, respect, 
and dignity to engage in decision making. 
 
Flexibility in the design of governmental functions generalizes our enabling mechanism ensuring 
applicability to all kinds of governmental units with a territory, e.g. at the local, regional, state and 
national levels. The domiciliaries, which may be members of multiple governmental units embedded 
within each other, determine through collective decision making the governmental function for each 
unit. A governmental function e.g. at the regional level may or may not be constrained by the kind of 
governmental unit it is applied to, and this unit’s interactions with other governmental units at the 
same, higher, or lower levels. 
                                                                 
26 The physical operation of a function may be contracted out, but the governmental unit determines e.g. how tax 




One characteristic of a state, it is often argued, is monopoly on the use of force within its territory. 
Both Frey (2001) and this article disagree. Multiple layers of government common throughout the 
world suggest otherwise. E.g. within the US, local, state and federal police forces usually operate 
within the same physical territory. Domiciliaries are usually members of multiple governmental units 
and determine through collective decision making the governmental function for each unit. This 
function determines what kind of coercive power can be exercised within each unit, concurrent with 
other governmental units at higher or lower levels. Without domiciliaries collective decision making 
reverts to residents and citizens and eventually to the owners of the territory. The unit is dissolved 
when the last remnants of the territory is accepted by another unit on the application of its owner.  
 
Examples of governmental units are local communes, towns, cities, counties, regions, other regional 
governmental bodies, states, countries, nations, and certain super-national governmental units (e.g. 
EU, UN). Frey (2001:163ff) claims to discuss “government without territorial monopoly”. He is 
correct that governments perform a variety of different functions, but ignores the fact that all his 
examples of “quasigovernmental organisations” actually control a territory. Let us consider his and 
some other examples. First, Frey (2001:164) claims that the United Nations and the International 
Court in Hague “do not have any monopoly power over a territory.” He is correct that the function 
is designed in this manner, but the function also requires acceptance of the UN Charter, and these 
supernational units consist of a collection of member countries with a territorial extent. Second, the 
Catholic church’s territory is the Vatican state. Its function relates partly to this territory, which it 
controls sovereignly, though mainly to member allegiance, etc. Third, sports associations (e.g. FIFA) 
are different from the UN. Although these have members from several countries, these countries as 
such are not members. Associations for sport, culture, religion, etc., action groups (e.g. 
Greenpeace), so-called NGOs, non-profit making and profit-making global firms, factories, mines, 
individual business owners, homeowners, etc. own territories of non-zero extent, e.g. with an 
administration or sales office. A  “No trespassing” sign satisfies the governmental function 
requirement. Although these are governmental units, the governmental function typically pertains to a 
variety of non-territorial characteristics, e.g. mandatory rituals or donations, in addition to voluntary 
exchange not specified by any function. Furthermore, the scope of allowed governmental functions is 
tightly circumscribed by higher order or lower order governmental units. These examples would  
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cease to be governmental units if they were to sell all their territory, and e.g. rent or lease it back. 
We exclude, as outside the scope of our analysis, governmental units without a territorial extent. 
 
Among these examples, governmental units at the highest level, such as the UN with a charter, and 
at the lowest levels, such as a homeowner owning a few square feet, have the most limited 
governmental functions. The UN has no influence on welfare and power distribution, education 
levels, tradeoffs between economics and environment, etc. within each member country, and a 
homeowner is easily invaded by the police, is subject to taxation and other regulations, etc. These 
functions are usually severely constrained by  governmental units at intermediate levels, such as 
nations, states, regions and local governments. These intermediate level governmental units are our 
main focus in this article. The nature of our argument is such that we see no clean-cut way, and also 
no reason, of excluding lower or higher level units from our definition. Frey (2001) attempts such 
exclusion through focusing on the building blocks of each governmental function, suggesting that 
some functions are more related to territory than others. They certainly are, but the design of each 
function is determined by domiciliaries through collective decision making. As researchers, we 
should refrain from dictating how domiciliaries within a territory should design their governmental 
function. 
 
Unfortunately, Frey (2001) does not provide a clear definition of a governmental unit. He seems to 
suggest that if a unit has sufficiently many resources, and/or is sufficiently powerful, and seems to be 
involved in governing in some sense by h aving a function, then it is a governmental or quasi-
governmental unit. Frey (2001) thus suggests that "there are meaningful governmental units, whose 
major characteristic is not the territorial extension of government but its function." This, he suggests, 
allows for the emergence of functional, overlapping, and competing jurisdictions, with a variable 
territory, over which they do not have territorial monopoly. In contrast, this article provides a clear 
definition of a governmental unit in terms of three characteristics. We agree with Frey (2001) that 
there are important organizations that do not have a territory, but think these should be distinguished 
from governmental units that do  have a territory.  Domiciliaries design through collective 
decisionmaking governmental functions, and may well assign labels such as functional, overlapping, 
competing, etc. to the various governmental units they are members of. To the extent governmental 
units at the same level or with similar functions, overlap, territorial monopoly gets divided between  
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governmental units as determined autonomously by each individual, i.e. "as the people want it". 
 
4 An alternative constitutional model 
The critique of mathematical models in the introduction does not mean that this section succumbs to 
a non-specific, qualitative, or sociological alternative constitutional model. Quite the contrary; the 
proposal falls firmly within the economic tradition where each individual maximizes his own welfare, 
but he does so in a manner where preferences and beliefs are not given in the traditional economic 
sense. Preferences and beliefs are partly and differentially known to the individuals, and they engage 
in bounded rationality and trial and error in attempts to increase welfare.
27 We recognize that it is 
never possible to fully know every individual’s set of preferences, i.e. omniscience is impossible.
28 
Thus our task is not to prescribe each individual’s actions, but rather to help each individual express 
his preferences in a more efficient manner. 
 
Most units today do not have formal mechanisms for the creation, termination, amendment, altering, 
redrawing of boundaries, and change of function of units. Instead many units (e.g. states) are 
assumed to exist unchanged for eternity. There may be benefits of loosening up this rigid structure, 
e.g. by introducing an enabling mechanism consisting of the following  Creation  Mechanism,
29 
Adjustment Mechanism, and Dissolution Mechanism.
30 
31 
                                                                 
27 Elster (1983) distinguishes between the “thin theory of individual rationality” (where preferences and beliefs 
are given) and the “broad theory of individual rationality” (looking at how preferences and beliefs are shaped, 
through judgment and satisficing). There exists much literature on this subject outside the scope of this article, 
initiated by Simon’s (1955) argument that man has limited capacity for processing information and preferences. 
28 Assuming quantitatively given and one-dimensional preferences, Alesina and Spolaore’s (1997:1030) model 
assumes that “the world population has mass 1, and we assume a continuum of individuals with ideal points 
distributed uniformly on the segment [0,1].” In contrast, we assume neither quantitative and one-dimensional 
preferences, nor specific citizens’ distributions. 
29 The Creation Mechanism functions through a self defining referendum thereby eliminating the need for apriori 
judgments, i.e. judgments external to the model itself, about the necessity of unit creation, the proposed borders, 
etc. A priori judgments, unfortunately, depend on the opinions, wisdom, knowledge, and the inherent biases of 
those individuals or that group making the judgment.  
30 Assumptions 1 and 2 are fundamental, and may by themselves imply 3 and 4 since any single citizen may 
achieve 3 and 4 by going via 1 and 2. However, we prefer to set up Assumptions 3 and 4 explicitly, as a shortcut, 
since the indirect implication is more cumbersome for the citizens and thus involves higher costs. Also note that 
1 and 2 presuppose collective action (even though N may be 1), while 3 and 4 are related to individual decisions. 
Collective action involving any number of possibly conflicting proposals and any number of decision makers 
rapidly increases complexity and may not have an easily agreed upon optimum solution (Black 1958). This article 
argues, however, that it is more important that there is a solution rather than whether or not it is the “optimum” 
solution. The reason for this relative lack of concern for reaching an optimum unit size (in terms of population 
and geographical extent) at the first iteration has to do with the self adjustment that may take place afterwards 
through the Adjustment Mechanism or, in a more cumbersome fashion, through repeated applications of the 




Creation Mechanism (Assumptions 1 and 2): 
Assumption 1. Each individual has the right, in collaboration w ith that subset of the individuals 
domiciled within the boundaries of a proposed unit, to create a new unit either within the boundaries 
of an existing unit, or by the amalgamation of two or more units or parts of units. 
 
Assumption 2. Any domiciliary
32 qualified to vote may sponsor a draft proposal for the creation of a 
new unit. The draft shall describe the boundaries of the proposed new unit, which must be a 
territorial unit and thus have a size at least marginally larger than zero. 
 
Adjustment Mechanism (Assumptions 3 and 4): 
Assumption 3. Each individual has the right to leave or to transit
33 through any unit and bring with 
him property of any kind. 
 
Assumption 4. Each individual has the right to withdraw from any unit's territory any of his non-
contested real estate that has been accepted by another unit or retain his existing domicile or 
citizenship and the territorial affiliation of his non-contested real estate in the case of creation of a 
new unit. 
 
Dissolution Mechanism (Assumption 5): 
Assumption 5. A unit must at all times have a non-zero territorial extent, and is dissolved otherwise.  
 
The Creation mechanism is a considerable transition toward individual freedom and direct 
democracy. Assumption 1 lets each individual choose where to be a domiciliary or citizen.
34 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
31 The basis for these assumptions may be found in a prior work of one of the authors, see Knutsen (1992) or 
www.basiclaw.net. 
32 We are using the term “domiciliary” to indicate that the person must have more than temporary residency 
within the unit. We could also have used the term citizen without significantly altering the overall result. In fact 
for most individuals and thus most of the time, for the overall result, it would not make a difference whether we 
used the term resident, domiciliary or citizen. There may, however, be occasions where due to rapid population 
shifts these slight differences may matter, and thus we have settled for the definition that most closely signifies a 
permanent attachment to the territory. 
33 Transit is relevant in terms of practical implementation of the model, e.g. when proceeding from one unit to 
another requires passing through a third unit. 
34 Just as stock exchanges pose requirements such a s minimum amounts of capital, trading, and other 
requirements for stock companies, as part of an actual implementation individuals may determine minimum or  
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Assumption 2 allows each individual to take the initiative to create a new unit. Requiring unit size at 
least marginally larger than zero is done to rule out units without territory, as discussed in section 3 
related to Frey (2001), and to ensure that each citizen/domiciliary has a location to “place his feet”. 
 
The Adjustment mechanism is a considerable transition toward freedom of movement. Assumption 3 
provides the usual personal exit mechanism, but includes “property of any kind”. This includes both 
portable assets and resources connected with territory, discussed in section 3, which, through 
physical movement or re-drawing borders, can be transferred to another unit. While the freedom of 
traditional “free” exit mechanisms are limited by ownership of resources connected with territory, 
travel costs, cultural barriers, etc., our mechanism reduces the exit costs associated with traditional 
immovables, cultural barriers etc.. Assumption 4 clarifies what is meant by the “movement” of real 
property and provides a mechanism that is independent of the actual movement of the physical 
person, i.e. a citizen’s property may move even though the citizen stays put. For the purpose of 
Assumptions 3 and 4, real estate is meant to include any other property interests associated with real 
estate, i.e. not only the land and buildings themselves, but also ores and minerals located below 
ground, or timber and agricultural products located above ground. The Creation and Adjustment 
mechanisms tie together citizens and real property owners. Individuals decide whether to create a 
new unit, but need at least one property owner or they need to purchase territory. The passage “that 
has been accepted by another unit” in Assumption 4 is essential since a governmental function for a 
unit may place restrictions on real estate that can be imported. A governmental function may also 
specify entry criteria for new members, e.g. specifying a fee, requesting certain competence levels, 
personal characteristics, family relationships, or denying entry if a desired size has been reached. 
 
The Dissolution mechanism in Assumption 5 allows units to dissolve. Just as a factory may be empty 
at night, even if all residents leave a unit temporarily, or permanently, the unit’s territory is still owned 
by someone.
35 Without domiciliaries collective decision making reverts to residents and citizens and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
maximum numbers of domiciliaries for the creation of certain governmental units. 
35 As a tentative hypothesis, the authors suggest that the UN may claim ownership to territory not claimed by 
anyone else. However,  there appears to be a belief that n o one owns the North Pole 
(http://members.tripod.com/90north/northpole.htm), although Canada at various times claims sovereignty, and 
Greenland (Denmark) has neighboring interests.  The continent surrounding the South Pole 
(http://www.globalclassroom.org/antarct9.html) constitutes nearly a tenth of the world's territory. Argentine, 
Australia, Chile, France, Norway, Russia, the UK, the US claim pie-slice sections, but the 1959 Antarctic Treaty 
freezes such territorial claims. No one has yet claimed ownership for the moon, Mars, etc. For disputed territory,  
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eventually to the owners of the territory. The unit is dissolved when the last remnants of the territory 
is accepted by another unit on the application of its owner. 
 
To see how the Creation, Adjustment, and Dissolution mechanisms may operate, consider the 
following statement by the 1991 Nobel prize winner Coase (1988d:117): 
“The government is, in a sense, a super-firm (but of a very special kind) since it is able to 
influence the use of factors of productions by administrative decision. But the ordinary firm is 
subject to checks in its operations because of the competition of other firms which might 
administer the same activities at lower cost, and also because there is always the alternative of 
market transactions against organization within the firm if the administrative costs become too 
great.”  
 
In Coase’s spirit, the proposed remedy of this article is to subject units to some of the same market 
forces as ordinary firms. The expectation is that this will materially lower the cost of government, or 
what amounts to the same thing, increase the benefits or welfare associated with governmental units. 
However, the definition of costs and benefits is much broader than Coase’s. I.e., we include not 
only the tangibles measurable by income, gross domestic product and the like, but also the more 
difficult to measure intangibles like lack of coercion, peace, subjective happiness, etc. 
 
Consider a given level (local, regional, global) with a certain number of governmental units and a 
certain number of domiciliaries within each unit. The utility or welfare u for each individual in a given 
unit
36, defined as benefits minus costs, can be defined as 
 
(,,,,,), uugsoprt =   (1) 
where 
g=geography (size, shape, etc of unit) 
s=Social factors (language, ethniticity, religion etc.) 
o=politics, social organization and legal system 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
we let the appropriate court settle the issue. For territory that is abandoned or not yet claimed, we assume that 
the first individual who claims it as his, is the owner, possibly through court settlement. 
36 The collective welfare function is a pure aggregate of the individual welfare functions, and is thus determined 
by the same variables.  
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p=population of unit 
r=resources, natural and man-made available to unit 
t=technology or knowledge available to unit 
 
The welfare function u has several important characteristics. First, it consists of many variables. The 
exact number will vary from case to case as any individual variable may be fixed (constant) for some 
units and variable for others. Additionally, there is no immediate and clear distinction between 
benefits and costs. E.g., particular values for social factors may be subjectively perceived as benefits 
by some individuals, and perceived as costs by other individuals. (In general whether any particular 
quantity is a cost or benefit depends on where we take our reference level, 0-level, to be.) If units 
are relatively large in terms of population and geographical size, each individual’s decision as to 
which unit to adhere to has only negligible impact on the character of the unit itself.
37 Thus we have a 
market-like structure, provided that transaction costs of all kinds (including discovery costs, decision 
making costs, etc.) are relatively low, which it is the purpose of the Creation  Mechanism and 
Adjustment Mechanism to provide. This article does not propose to abolish government. Thus the 
benefits of administrative decisions noted by Coase will still be available to the extent that the costs 
in the aggregate are lower than what may be obtained in the market. 
 
5 Advantages of the alternative constitutional model with limitations 
The advantages of the Creation Mechanism and Adjustment Mechanism are as follows: 
1.  All decision making is delegated down to each autonomous individual where no majority voting 
allows for the “tyranny” of the majority over the minority. 
2.  The absence of exit and entry barriers causes sizes of units to be optimally adjusted as each 
individual maximizes his welfare. This self-adjustment feature has many advantages. 
3.  Although there are differences in the impediments to the creation and destruction of units, and 
although violence may play a role, this article suggests that benefits may be realized by lowering 
those many and diverse barriers to entry that do exist. 
4.  The benefits of loosening up the rigid structure in sections 2 and 3 may be of the quantifiable 
kind, e.g. better services at a lower cost, and thus better operational resource utilization. 
5.  The benefits may also be of the less easily quantifiable kind, e.g. better allocation of resources in  
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the sense of more closely adhering to the subjective preferences of the individuals. 
6.  If the end result of the present mechanisms described in sections 2 and 3, and the Creation 
Mechanism and Adjustment Mechanism is the same, e.g. a new unit, substantial welfare benefits 
and other benefits may be gained by having the issue settled peacefully rather than violently. 
7.  Even if the end result is not the same, e.g. because the alternative constitutional model allows for 
the creation of units that would not have been created otherwise or for the non-creation
38 of 
units that would have been created through a more violent method (certainly not a very common 
occurrence), there may still be welfare benefits. Such benefits arise from the rational behavior 
hypothesis where one of the postulates is that more choice is preferable to less choice.
39 Recent 
econometric results by Frey et al. (2001:2) support the hypothesis that more choice, from the 
individual’s point of view, is better than less choice. I.e., there may be benefits associated with 
the process itself, referred to by Frey et al. (2001) as process utility, quite independent of the 
final result. Even without evident benefits,
40 there would still be a welfare benefit associated with 
having the option of creating a new unit whether that option is exercised or not. 
8.  The mechanisms tend to optimize governmental units independently of how units are modeled, as 
shown below. 
 
Further advantages of the Creation Mechanism are as follows: 
9.  No a priori judgment by the individuals or anyone else is necessary, since the mechanism is self 
defining (a self defining referendum). It is self defining because it is the proposal itself that defines 
the boundaries of the proposed new unit, which implicitly defines who are the decision makers 
(voters). 
10. The mechanism is also self-limiting, and self-adjusting with respect to geographical size and 
population. If the proposed geographical size or population is too large or too small, the 
proposal will fail as the individuals will no longer believe it to be in their interest to vote in favor 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
37 As is always the case, if the number of participants is low, we no longer have a marketlike structure. 
38 Non-creation applies to the actual process. Non-creation means absence of creation. I.e., it applies to a unit 
that might have existed, but never was created. Non-creation is thus distinct from abolishment which applies to 
an existing unit. More specifically, non-creation applies to men living in Hobbes’ (1651:chap. XIII-XIV) ”state of 
war”, without “natural laws” to govern them, thus not creating a new unit, and not abolishing a unit since no unit 
exists. 
39 I.e., expanding the opportunities for peaceful voluntary unit creation or non-creation by itself increases welfare, 
if for no other reason than because of the expanded choice itself. 
40 Benefits would not be evident if the unit in question had perfect knowledge of each citizen’s preferences and 
was perfectly responsive; a somewhat tall order.  
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of the proposal. Thus it is in the interests of the sponsors of the proposal to adjust the proposal 
to what they believe to be an optimum value. 
11. When optimizing with respect to size, keeping the other variables constant, the Creation 
Mechanism makes possible moves to the global maximum of the welfare function, since the 
people do not have to pass through valleys between local maxima in cases when the welfare 
function is not single peaked. While the Adjustment Mechanism is gradual, i.e. individual by 
individual or lot by lot as far as territory goes, and thus moves you from one point to the next 
point adjoining on the welfare surface
41, the Creation Mechanism makes possible much more 
radical changes directly from one point on the surface to virtually any other point. 
42 
 
Further advantages of the Adjustment Mechanism are as follows: 
12. Adjustments at the edges give optimal size of government (local optimum). 
13. Adjustments at the edges give local minimum for the cost function, or local maximum for 
corresponding welfare function. 
14. Adjustments in general involve fewer people and less territory and may be made to operate at a 
lower total cost than referenda. Adjustments, together with the option of the Creation 
Mechanism, provide an implied unanimity in the adherence to a governmental unit. 
15. Even if many factors like geography and resources influencing optimal size of government may 
remain fairly constant, others change, e.g. population, social factors, politics, and above all 
technology. 
 
Let us illustrate through four different lines of reasoning how the Creation, Adjustment, and 
Dissolution mechanisms tend to optimize governmental units independently of how units are 
modeled. 
 
1. Let us use Coase’s model of government as a firm, described above. Firms emphasize minimizing 
                                                                 
41 Each citizen’s welfare function has a component related to other citizens. When the population is large, the 
impact of a one-person population change on each of the other citizens is small, approaching zero as the 
population approaches infinity, but nevertheless facilitates an incremental move from one point on the welfare 
surface to the next adjoining point.  
42 Multipeaked utility functions may for instance come about as a consequence of possible shifts in technology. 
E.g., when sufficiently many citizens decide to move from a small to a large unit, it may e.g. at some point become 
feasible to build a new subway system or a new highway to increase welfare. This gives a peak at a low 
population/geographical extent value, and another peak at a high population/geographical extent value that  
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costs of production. Firms exist because there are costs associated with market transactions that 
may be eliminated by internalizing the allocation of resources. This internalization creates 
administrative costs. For any given product or service the firm internalizes those functions where the 
administrative costs are lower than the corresponding transaction costs in order to optimize 
(minimize) the sum of costs per unit of output and thus maximize profits. If a firm fails to optimize its 
cost structure, it may go out of business as customers switch to substitutes from other lower cost 
firms. The market mechanism thus constrains the firm both on the input side (encouraging the firm to 
enter into market transactions for those inputs it cannot obtain at a lower cost internally) and on the 
output side since the price obtainable for its outputs are determined by the market. With the 
proposed mechanisms, governments will be similarly constrained on the output side. If a unit charges 
(through taxes or fees) substantially more for the same (or nearly the same) products and services as 
nearby units, it will find its borders closing in on it as its residents migrate to other units either through 
the Creation Mechanism or the Adjustment Mechanism. Thus, assuming the managers of 
governmental units would like to “stay in business”, they will have broadly the same incentive as 
“firm” managers in optimizing their cost structure. (Even if there’s no conscious effort on the part of 
unit managers as such, the end result will anyhow be that the low-cost producers will be the 
survivors.) 
 
2. The proposed model tends to optimize the size of units. Many typical local governmental tasks 
have a cost function that is size dependent. If the unit size (in terms of population or area) is too 
small, costs are high. Cost per unit then falls as size increases until a certain optimum, beyond which 
costs again rise. To the ultimate customer it doesn’t really matter whether the terms of the provided 
service is competitive because of optimal input selection according to point 1 above or because the 
governmental unit as such has an optimal size. But if size is non-optimal, an alternative governmental 
unit may become even more attractive by combining an optimum input selection with optimum size. 
Thus in a long-term equilibrium situation both size and the proper mix of internal and market 
transactions will be optimized. 
 
3. While the two lines of reasoning above is most readily applicable to typical local governmental 
functions, social, legal and cultural issues may often be more prevalent at higher levels of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
enables highway construction, while all intermediate points cause lower welfare.   
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government. Historically, state creation has come about primarily because of social and cultural 
issues rather than narrow economic considerations. The mechanisms are not, however, size 
dependent; they work equally well whether at the county, city or township level or at the state or 
national level. Neither are the proposed mechanisms dependent on the motivating factor whether it 
be narrow economic interests or cultural factors. The mechanisms are there to facilitate transactions, 
they don’t ask you why you want to transact. Consequently, the proposed mechanisms take into 
account not only what can be measured like the cost of services, but also those intangibles like 
religion, political system, and other social and cultural issues, that are subjectively important, but 
difficult to measure. The long term equilibrium will be determined by all these factors, and thus may 
or may not coincide with the results obtainable through a more technocratic long term cost function 
even if that could be constructed.
43 
 
4. The mechanisms may also be analyzed in terms of the unanimity criterion proposed by Wicksell 
(1896), extended by Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Buchanan and Tullock (1962:64) point out that 
the expected external costs to each resident of collective decision making reaches zero when the 
decision requires unanimity. This is because “he will not willingly allow others to impose external 
costs on him when he can effectively prevent this from happening.” The proposed mechanism does 
not impose a unanimity criterion for all decisions, but it does in a sense require unanimity or very 
near unanimity, in the context of adherence to a particular territorial unit
44. The reason is that any 
resident may at any time propose the creation of a new unit, and a resident landowner may in fact 
decide as a single resident whether a new unit should be created. This adherence to a particular unit 
places definite constraints on the aggregate outcome of all decisions. The aggregate outcome must, 
taken as a whole, confer net benefits on all individuals within that unit. Furthermore, these benefits 
cannot be less than the benefits any other unit is capable of offering to that particular resident, absent 
decision making and transaction costs, and assuming equivalent other costs. The implication, over 
time, is that Pareto optimal solutions are obtained where no resident can be made better off without 
making somebody else worse off. 
                                                                 
43 The emphasis on facilitating market like transactions also eliminates the need for any (a priori) normative 
judgments about which factors “ought” to be included in any explicit optimization. Thus in a very real sense we 
bypass much of the current discussion regarding the size of units, optimal level of public goods provisioning, 
taxation etc. Once we leave these issues directly to the citizens, our own opinions become unimportant. 
44 If that territorial unit is a sovereign state we do in a sense impose this unanimity requirement on the 




Regarding point 4, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) do not impose the practical unanimity criterion, 
which makes their conclusions problematic in terms of the criteria discussed above. Alesina and 
Spolaore (1997:1035)  apply  a majority decision making model, which does not assure Pareto 
optimality. Although they can assure that the aggregate outcome confers net benefits on the majority 
of individuals within that unit, they cannot assure that net benefits are conferred on all individuals 
within the unit. This means that disgruntled individuals have nowhere to go in Alesina and Spolaore’s 
(1997) approach, and must accept the tyranny of the majority discussed in section 2. Alesina and 
Spolaore’s (1997) approach thus stands in stark contrast to the approach in this article, which 
indeed allows each disgruntled individual somewhere to go through individual decisionmaking. 
 
Furthermore,  Alesina and Spolaore’s (1997) main conclusion, that democratization leads to an 
inefficiently large n umber of countries, is only correct for their majority decision making model. 
When other decision making models are applied, such as the one in this article imposing the practical 
unanimity criterion, a different conclusion is reached. It is quite possible that democratization leads to 
a large number of countries, but this number is not necessarily inefficient, and the question is also 
inefficient for whom. From the individual’s point of view, our proposal leads to a number of 
countries that is reasonably efficient, though we are open to the possibility that an omnipotent and 
omniscient leader may find an even more efficient number of countries. 
 
Let us contemplate a few limitations. First, Frey (2001:170-171) contemplates whether residents 
and consumers become overburdened in a direct democracy. We propose that mechanisms for 
voting can be adequately structured, applying the internet with the advent of electronic signatures. 
Frey proposes that “a governmental or a private advisory service can be established, which offers 
information and support for the consumers’ decisions.” 
 
Second, the mechanisms may create states that are economically inefficient in a narrow sense. The 
response is that this doesn’t really matter. Narrow economic efficiency may not be what the 
population wants; i .e. it is the subjective welfare of each resident that counts, not an outside 
observers opinion on what the welfare preferences of the participants ought to look like. Residents 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Assumption 2: “The draft shall describe the boundaries of the new state and its constitution.”  
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may legitimately trade monetary income for other intangible subjective benefits. 
 
Third, the mechanisms may create states that are non-contiguous and thereby dysfunctional. The 
response is that yes, states may be non-contiguous. However, whether such a state is necessarily 
dysfunctional is a question that has to be answered not by economists or outside observers, but by 
the residents, which constitute the group that is most directly involved. This is something the 
population would have to consider in their voting. 
 
Fourth, the mechanisms may impose costs on parties outside the proposed borders, e.g. people 
suddenly finding that they are located on a border instead of in the middle of a country. This is a 
general problem, any real consumption or investment decision influences other people. It is only in 
the idealized world of perfect markets that externalities do not exist. If I decide to move my grocery 
purchases elsewhere, my current supplier may go out of business and his employees become 
unemployed. Does this mean that I should be restricted in my choice of where to buy my groceries? 
The externalities we impose are in many respects needed to get the market mechanism and an 
efficient resource allocation to function. If our grocery supplier loses customers this provides him 
with the information he needs to either enhance his product, or, if he goes out of business, releases 
resources that can be put to better use elsewhere. The real question is not between the mechanisms 
proposed in this article and a perfect world, but between the mechanisms and the state of affairs as 
they are today, or between the mechanisms and other less than perfect mechanisms. 
 
Fifth, Higher level governmental units have a legitimate role to play in arbitrating conflicts between 
lower  level governmental units. At the world wide level this would mean that the UN and the 
International Court of Justice would have a legitimate role in arbitrating conflicts related to the 
implementation of our mechanism between sovereign nations, and that a national government would 
have a legitimate role in arbitrating conflicts between component states in a federation and so on 
down to the lowest level.  The function of each higher level  governmental unit, however, is 
determined by the domiciliaries of its members through collective desicionmaking. These domicilaries 
may delegate desicionmaking authority to experts representing higher level units, but can withdraw 





The article suggests a constitutional model attempting to remedy shortcomings of the contemporary 
constitutional models, at the local, national, or super national levels. Rather than focusing on a 
narrow model with restrictive and specialized assumptions, and subsequent solutions, as has been 
common in the literature, the article defines a governmental unit in a straightforward manner. We 
thereafter propose a straightforward enabling mechanism consisting of creation, adjustment, and 
dissolution mechanisms for governmental units. This gives autonomy to each domiciliary as in a direct 
democracy. Realizing that residents are themselves best equipped to find their own solutions, the 
emphasis is on the practical approach of how residents discover and implement their subjective 
preferences and how this discovery and implementation process can be facilitated and 
corresponding costs lowered. 
 
The article subjects governmental units to some of the same market forces as ordinary firms, in the 
spirit of Coase (1988a). This brings the interaction between governmental units closer to a market 
structure, and serves to eliminate or reduce many of the coercive elements of government. Creating 
a more market like structure reduces or eliminates the need for normative or a priori judgments 
about the optimum size of units, optimum provision of goods and services, optimum level of taxation, 
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